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Books in Brief: New and Notable
A Covenant of Creatures: Levinas's Philosophy of Judaism by
Michael Fagenblat
Stanford University Press
“I am not a particularly Jewish thinker,” said Emmanuel Levinas, “I
am just a thinker.” This book argues against the idea, affirmed by
Levinas himself, that Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being
separate philosophy from Judaism. By reading Levinas's philosophical
works through the prism of Judaic texts and ideas, Fagenblat contends
that what Levinas called “ethics” is as much a hermeneutical product
wrought from the Judaic heritage as a series of phenomenological
observations. Decoding Levinas's philosophy of Judaism within a
Heideggerian and Pauline framework, Fagenblat uses biblical, rabbinic,
and Maimonidean texts to provide sustained interpretations of the
philosopher's work. Ultimately, he calls for a reconsideration of the
relation between tradition and philosophy and of the meaning of faith
without the foundations of epistemology.
Fighting Back: British Jewry's Military Contribution in the Second World War by Martin Sugarman
Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell
This book is a response to the oft—perpetrated myths of British Jewry's alleged lack of fighting spirit and its failure to participate in the
Second World War. British Jewry has never formed more than about
one half of one percent of the population, yet the figures show that
their contribution to the armed forces has always been out of proportion to their numbers.
Sugarman's book provides a snapshot of the British Jewish contribution to the Allied victory over the Nazi and Japanese threat. It also
highlights the role of the Jews in the Spanish Civil War and the Korean
War. Its wide—ranging approach to the contributions of Jews investi-
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gates, among other things: the Paratroopers at the Battle of Arnhem;
the much neglected and almost forgotten Auxiliary Services of the Civil
Defense, in this case the Fire Service; the Jews at Bletchley from the
memory of those who are the keepers of the British war remembrance
memorials, and is never included in the British tributes to the Commonwealth/Empire forces who served, even though many other ethnic
groups are well represented.
British Jewry, together with Jews from Israel, may thus be deeply and
justly proud of this history of fighting back, fighting for democracy and
peace.
Pirke Avot: Timeless Wisdom for Modern Life by William Berkson
Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society
In this new edition of the beloved Jewish classic, Berkson helps us see
that Pirke Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) is more than just a fundamental religious text. It is also a compelling contemporary ethical guide.
Berkson looks at the individual sayings, or “mishnayot,” through the
interpretations of the great Jewish commentators and also within the
broader context of Western thought—through views found in the Bible,
the ancient Greeks, the Enlightenment, Buddhism, Confucianism, and
American culture.
The Visual Culture of Chabad by Maya Balakirsky Katz
New York: Cambridge University Press
This book presents the first full—length study of a vast and complex
visual tradition produced, revered, preserved, banned, and destroyed
by the Hasidic movement of Chabad. This rich repository of visual
artifacts provides the archaeological data for an analysis of how the
movement consolidated its influence during a period of political and
economic transformation and survived its immigration to America
in the wake of the Holocaust. Chabad is one of the most self—documented and media—preserved modern Jewish movements, and its
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rich material culture—including the hand–held portrait, the “rebbishe”
space, the printer's mark, and the public menorah—affords scholars a
wider range of interpretive strategies for understanding the movement
and the role of the visual experience in religion.
The Lost Minyan by David M. Gitlitz
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press
An intricately woven tapestry of historical fiction, Gitlitz profiles ten
Crypto—Jewish families coping with the trauma of living between
worlds, neither wholly Catholic nor wholly Jewish. Struggling to hide
their secrets from neighbors, servants, children, and even spouses,
they try to resolve the tension between their need for and fear of community. Attempting to navigate the mandates of the Church and their
own idiosyncratic version of Jewish customs, they wonder on which law
to peg their hopes of eternal salvation; and they wonder how to safely
pass their Crypto—Jewish identity on to the next generation. While the
details and conversations of these lives are fictional, they draw from
historical fact as documented in eyewitness accounts, contemporary
chronicles, and the dossiers of Inquisition trials in the archives of Spain
and Mexico.
Through a Narrow Window: Friedl Dicker—Brandeis and Her
Terezin Students by Linney Wix
Alburquerque: University of New Mexico Press
Not long after the end of World War II, two suitcases from Terezin, the
so—called model ghetto designed by the Nazi propaganda machine
to showcase creative endeavors, were delivered to members of what
remained of the Jewish community of Prague. The contents of the
suitcases included children's drawings, paintings, and collages made
at Terezin. Rediscovered in the 1950s, the pictures, by then housed
at the Jewish Museum in Prague, were exhibited, and over time some
were published. Friedl Dicker—Brandeis was the remarkable woman
who taught art to many of Terezin's children before she was killed at
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Auschwitz. While she has been valorized for her heroic efforts as a
teacher, her approach to teaching art has remained unexamined.
This book and the accompanying exhibition offer a closer look at the
methods and philosophy of Dicker—Brandeis's teaching, the history
behind it, and its possible psychological effects on the children interned at Terezin. Besides discussing aesthetic empathy as the basis
of her teaching philosophy and practice, the book includes biographical
and art historical information on Dicker—Brandeis, who trained at the
Weimar Bauhaus, and restores her to her rightful place as an artist,
teacher and heroine behind Nazi lines in the Second World War.
Gender and American Jews: Patterns in Work, Education, and
Family in Contemporary Life by Harriet Hartman and Moshe
Hartman
Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press
The Hartmans interpret the results of the two most recent National
Jewish Population Surveys. Building on their critical work of 1996, and
drawing on relevant sociological work on gender, religion, and secular
achievement, this new book brings their analysis of gendered patterns
in contemporary Jewish life right to the present moment.
The first part of the book examines the distinctiveness of American
Jews in terms of family behavior, labor—force patterns, and educational and occupational attainment. The second investigates the interrelationships between “Jewishness” and religious, economic, and family
behavior, including intermarriage. Deploying an engaging assortment
of charts and graphs and a rigorous grasp of statistics, the authors
provide a multifaceted portrait of a multidimensional population.
Levirate Marriage and the Family in Ancient Judaism by Dvora
E. Weisberg
Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press
The author uses levirate marriage (an institution involving the union of
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a man and the widow of his childless brother) as described in biblical
law and explicated in rabbinic Judaism as a lens to examine the status
of women and attitudes toward marriage, sexuality, and reproduction
in early Jewish society. While marriage generally marks the beginning
of a new family unit, levirate comes into play when a family's life is
cut short. As such, it offers an opportunity to study the family at a
moment of breakdown and restructuring. With her discussion rooted in
rabbinic sources and commentary, Weisberg explores kinship structure
and descent, the relationship between a family unit created through
levirate marriage and the extended family, and the roles of individuals
within the family. She also considers the position of women, asking
whether it is through marriage or the bearing of children that a woman
becomes part of her husband's family, and to what degree a married
woman remains part of her natal family. Weisberg argues that rabbinic
responses to levirate suggest that a family is an evolving entity, one
that can preserve itself through realignment and redefinition.
Sacred Trash: The Lost and Found World of the Cairo Geniza by
Adina Hoffman and Peter Cole
New York: Shocken Books and Nextbook
One May day in 1896, in Cambridge, England, a meeting took place
between a Romanian—born maverick Jewish Intellectual and twin
learned Presbyterian Scotswomen, who had assembled to inspect
several pieces of rag paper and parchment. It was the unlikely start
of a remarkable saga. The authors tell the story of the retrieval from
an Egyptian geniza, or repository for worn—out texts, of the most
important cache of Jewish manuscripts ever discovered. Weaving
together unforgettable portraits of the scholar—heroes of his drama
with explorations of the medieval documents themselves, Hoffman and
Cole present a panoramic view of 900 years of vibrant Mediterranean
Judaism. Part biography and part meditation on the supreme value the
Jewish people has long placed on the written word, this is above all a
gripping tale of adventure and redemption.
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Not in the Heavens: The Tradition of Jewish Secular Thought by
David Biale
Princeton University Press
This book traces the rise of Jewish secularism through the visionary
writers and thinkers who led its development. Spanning the rich history of Judaism from the Bible to today, Biale shows how the secular
tradition these visionaries created is a uniquely Jewish one, and how
the emergence of Jewish secularism was not merely a response to
modernity but arose from forces long at play within Judaism itself. He
explores how ancient Hebrew books like Job, Song of Song, and Esther
downplay or even exclude God altogether, and how Spinoza, inspired
by medieval Jewish philosophy, recast the biblical God in the role of
nature and stripped the Torah of its revelatory status to instead read
scripture as a historical and cultural text. Biale examines the influential
Jewish thinkers who followed Spinoza's secularizing footsteps, such as
Salomon Maimon, Heinrich Heine, Sigmund Freud, and Albert Einstein.
He tells the stories of those who also took their cues from medieval
Jewish mysticism in their revolts against tradition, including Hayim
Nahman Bialik, Gershom Scholem, and Franz Kafka. And he looks at
Zionists like David Ben—Gurion and other secular political thinkers who
recast Israel and the Bible in modern terms of race, nationalism and
the state.
Foreplay: Hannah Arendt, the Two Adornos, and Walter Benjamin by Carl Djerassi
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press
Arendt, Benjamin, Theodor and Gretel Adorno were intellectual giants
of the first half of the 20th century. This dramatic play explores their
deeply human and psychologically intriguing private lives, focusing on
professional and personal jealousies, and the border between erotica
and pornography. Djerassi's extensive biographical research brings
to light many fascinating details revealed in the dialogues among the
characters, including Adorno's obsession with his dreams. Benjamin's
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admiration for Franz Kafka, and the intimate correspondence between
Gretel Adorno and Benjamin. The introduction of a fictitious character,
“Fraulein X,” intensifies the complex interplay among the four lead protagonists and allows for a comparison of Adorno's philandering and the
similar behavior of Martin Heidegger whose affair with Hannah Arendt
is well known. The play brims with intrigue and the friction created
when strong personalities clash.
The Synagogue in America: A Short History by Marc Lee Raphael
New York University Press
In 1789, when George Washington was elected the first president of
the United States, laymen from all six Jewish congregations in the
new nation sent him congratulatory letters. He replied to all six. Thus,
after more than a century of Jewish life in colonial America the small
communities of Jews present at the birth of the nation proudly announced their religious institutions to the country and were recognized
by its new leader. By this time, the synagogue had become the most
significant institution of American Jewish life, a dominance that was
not challenged until the twentieth century, when other institutions such
as Jewish community centers or Jewish philanthropic organizations
claimed to be the hearts of their Jewish communities.
Concise yet comprehensive, The Synagogue in America is the first
history of this all—important structure, illuminating its changing role
within the American Jewish community over the course of three centuries. From Atlanta and Des Moines to Los Angeles and New Orleans,
Marc Lee Raphael moves beyond the New York metropolitan area to
examine Orthodox, Reform, Conservative, and Reconstuctionist synagogue life everywhere. Using the records of approximately 125 Jewish
congregations, he traces the emergence of the synagogue in the
United States from its first instances in the colonial period, when each
of the half dozen initial Jewish communities had just one synagogue
each, to its proliferation as the nation and the American Jewish com-
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munity grew and diversified.
Encompassing architecture, forms of worship, rabbinic life, fundraising,
creative liturgies, and feminism, The Synagogue in America is the go—
to history for understanding the synagogue's significance in American
Jewish life.
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Hasidic Women: Boundaries and Empowerment
A review essay by Shulamit S. Magnus
Mitzvah Girls: Bringing up the Next Generation of Hasidic Jews
in Brooklyn. Princeton University Press.
Ayala Fader’s award winning Mitzvah Girls, based on her doctoral dissertation, is an ethnography of girls and women in the Bobover Hasidic
community of Boro Park, Brooklyn and the ways that they are socialized and socialize others, to construct Hasidic society. It is a fascinating book whose purpose, Fader says, is to exemplify one major case of
an “alternative modernity,” since as she shows, Bobov Hasidism seeks
messianic redemption yet depends, in highly specific ways, on participation in and knowledge of secular modernity. Fader places her work
in a school of literature contesting the notion of a “singular Western
modernity against which non–Western others in postcolonial contexts
react”—a construct its critics, including Fader, say essentializes Western modernity.
Fader’s research certainly contests and complicates any such simple
dualism and brings the culture of Hasidic girls and women into the
discourse about “parallel” or “alternative” modernities, major accomplishments. It also sheds important new light on contemporary
Hasidism through its focus on female social organization and culture
and the pivotal role that women play in constructing the gendered,
hierarchical roles that underlie Hasidism, without which it could not
function. Fader gives important comparative information about girls
and women in other Hasidic groups to the right and left of Bobov,
and about unaffiliated Hasidim (yes, all these exist), as well as about
non–Hasidic Orthodox women who intersect with the Bobovers in their
schools, as teachers (if nothing else, the book is an excellent primer in
the heterogeneity of Hasidism, and Orthodoxy as a whole). Thus, we
see Bobov society on a continuum of Hasidic and Orthodox attitudes
and practices, which allows more nuanced appreciation of their particular approach to Hasidic world production and maintenance, to borrow
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Peter Berger.
Fader turns to advantage her disbarment as a woman from an ethnographic study of Hasidic men and the male rituals, texts, institutions,
and authorities that are the more common stuff of studies of Hasidism,
shifting the focus to everyday life in women’s domains: at home, on
the playground, the street, and in particular, in girls’ schools, where
women shape values, identity, and culture, and themselves. Fader
spent years as a participant–observer in these settings, learning the
languages (plural) needed to gain trust and a nuanced understanding
of what Bobover women were doing, with what methods and understanding, as they seek to fulfill what they see as a divinely ordained
mandate, mediated to them through the authority of their husbands,
rabbis, and ultimately, that of the Bobover rebbe, to raise “the next
generation of Hasidic Jews”—the only true Jews, they believe, whose
Judaism can, or should, endure.
As a result, her book is also a significant contribution to the study of
women and religion, in particular, to seeing how women are made
dynamic agents in a patriarchal, utterly androcentric religious system, against common stereotypes of them as simply dominated and
oppressed there. It is from the perspective of someone particularly
interested in this last area that I come to this review.
Among the many strengths of this book is its methodological transparency. Ms. Fader opens with an excursus about Yiddish, since knowing
variants of this language is crucial to her ability to carry out her work,
and having some sense of it is crucial to her readers’ ability to understand what they are “hearing.” Throughout the book, Fader presents
transliterated and translated conversation and other exchanges in
Yiddish and Yiddish–inflected English recorded during her field work.
Thus, readers are not asked to accept Fader’s interpretations or assertions based on these data, shortcomings of more anecdotal books
about Hasidic society (and its dropouts), but see for themselves what
her subjects said, and what Ms. Fader is making of it, why, and how.
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As part of her methodological honesty in doing “ethical anthropology,”
Fader reveals her own positioning as a researcher: she is Jewish, secular, urban, of a certain generation, and of course, a highly educated,
professional woman. She becomes engaged and is married while doing
her fieldwork, which includes a focus on these life stages among the
Bobover, information she shares not only with readers, but with her
informants. Fader considers the role that her identities and emotions
(she becomes close to some of her informants, inviting one to her
wedding), play in her field work, and in how she writes this book: what
she chooses to engage, and to leave unengaged, particularly “political
and religious convictions” of her informants that she says, without
elaboration, are “troubling” to her. The larger implications of her subjects’ worldview and behavior for Judaism or Jewish life as a whole,
and for the place of Jews in the larger world, fall outside the purview
of this book, though they are certainly worthy of, indeed, call for consideration.
In her Introduction, Fader raises the seemingly counter–intuitive possibility that the Bobover women’s commitment “to civilize the secular
world through Jewish practice has the potential to create an alternative
religious modernity” (my emphasis). Indeed, the book is a substantial
argument against simplistic, popular dismissals of Hasidism as throwback, as pre–modern, or even as traditional. Instead, Fader, citing
other scholars of religion, calls the Hasidim “nonliberal” (rejecting the
more popular term, “fundamentalist”), a function of their rejection of
self–realization and individual autonomy as ends in themselves ; how
these values are adopted and made part of Hasidic worldview is a major focus of the book. The Bobover’s religious and political stance requires women—but not men—not to reject the modern, secular world,
but quite the contrary, to engage with it—in order to enable male
preoccupation with the sacred, a male–specific religious mandate and
the apex of Hasidic values. In this gendered and hierarchical division of
labor, women are made scouts, as it were, probes of the modern and
the secular since these, or at least aspects of these, are indispensable
to the group’s economic viability, for which women are made heavily

14 | VCU Menorah Review
responsible. Women are also made responsible for other vital functions, such as interaction with doctors, social service agencies, utility
companies, that require a broader worldliness, and knowledge of English, than men are permitted. Thus girls (education is sex–segregated
from the start), are taught more, and better, English, more and better
math and other secular studies, than boys. As teenagers and in the
post high school women’s teachers’ seminary that is common in Bobov
(relatively moderate) Hasidism (but not in stricter, e.g., Satmar, variants; college is not an option for either sex in any Hasidic sect), they
are made aware of new findings in child psychology and pedagogical
methods and incorporate these, selectively and adaptively, into child
rearing and teaching practices that are at stark variance with those of
pre–modern Jewish society (on which, cf. Ivan Marcus, Rituals of Childhood, though Fader’s book provides many examples of mothers and
teachers remarking on the variance between methods they practice
and those of their parents and teachers, with theirs avowedly marked
superior—hardly uninterrogated “traditionalism”). Compared to the
extremely, even extravagantly distinctive clothing of boys and men,
Hasidic girls and women wear “relatively unmarked” (secular) clothing
(p.2), to facilitate their ability to interface with the outside world,
Fader says. (I would note, however, that the lack of sacralized clothing
for women—there is no women’s equivalent for men’s long black, or
in some sects, gold brocade caftans; sacramental fur hats, flowing
prayer shawls—is but a Hasidic variant of the lack of sacralization of
women’s bodies altogether in traditional Judaism, in stark contrast to
the sacralization of male bodies). [1]To readers familiar with pre–war
Eastern European Jewish society, this arrangement will appear as
merely the continuation of women of the shtetl running the shops so
men could “learn” (a stereotype much in need of revision but useful
for our purposes here). [2] However, in the surprisingly robust world of
post–World War II American Hasidism, women’s outside engagement
is not just economic and pragmatic but cultural, thus fundamentally
different, more significant, and more interesting, than the pre–war
variant.
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Mandating engagement with the outside culture for half the population,
particularly that charged with “raising the next generation of Hasidic
Jews,” would seem profoundly counterproductive to the separatism and
xenophobia that underlie most sects of Hasidism. This engagement,
indeed, is recognized as a potentially subversive element requiring
strong counter measures in the early and ongoing socialization of girls
and women and the vigilance of the community. The interface with
secular modernity, occurring in liminal space between Hasidic society
and what Hasidim call “the goyishe” (Gentile) world—which, it must
be emphasized, includes secular and even Modern Orthodox Jews—becomes a substrate, a fertile medium producing an elaborate, articulated system of sifting what is borrowed, or more precisely, adapted from
the outside, and what is rejected. And it produces a Hasidic ideology
that is the particular domain of women.
The interface with secular culture makes the Hasidic cultural position
of girls and women inherently unstable. Since the outside culture is
in constant flux—secular culture recognizes and valorizes constant
change and “improvement,” while Hasidism valorizes what it claims
is continuation of allegedly timeless belief and practice—the female
Hasidic response to secular modernity is not fixed and definitive but
dynamic, constantly changing in response to changing fashions in
dress, music, in technological innovations both serious and seemingly
frivolous (x boxes, other techno–toys). Thus, Hasidic female culture is
in constant dialogue with secular modernity—the distinction typically
assigned to modern Orthodoxy. Engagement with the outside, the
ongoing creation of both sieve holes and boundary lines, and the ideology to justify both, mark female Hasidism in stark, though symbiotic
contrast to male Hasidism.
Women’s Hasidism, Fader argues, is not about rejecting modernity but
changing its meaning. Core modern values like freedom, progress,
and self–actualization, are not rejected but redefined. Harnessed to
the higher ideal of Hasidic religious practice, girls are taught that
these values can and should be achieved; when “the religious and the
secular, the material and the spiritual, the body and the soul are made
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complementary and not oppositional,” girls are told, they will find
true personal fulfillment as well as divine reward, and even a role in
bringing about the final redemption (p. 3). The fact that women are
entrusted with these critical functions creates agency and limited yet
significant authority, endowing this most patriarchal of societies with a
robust if distinctly subordinate female sector. This reality, too, complicates depictions of contemporary Hasidism as simply misogynistic and
its women simply as dominated, and helps explain, in part at least,
the hold of this culture on natives as well as its attraction to those who
choose to join it, a phenomenon which evidence brought in this book
makes clear, not limited to the outreach–oriented Lubavitch Hasidim.
The bulk of Fader’s inquiry is devoted to illustrating the mechanisms
by which women’s role is constructed and conveyed to girls, who as
adults become the teachers, mothers, and homemakers who enact
its ideology and practice, molding Hasidic society. Fader surveys
structures beginning with female infancy to normative late–teenage,
arranged marriage, “to understand how Hasidic women teach girls to
discipline their desires and their bodies as they redeem Jewish meaning from North American secular and Gentile life.” (p. 31). Her early
chapters do a close reading of psychological and linguistic techniques
to socialize girls to conform to Hasidic norms for them; to fear becoming “like Gentiles;” and to direct their curiosity in approved channels.
The didactic techniques are unapologetically heavy handed. Approved
behavior is conspicuously rewarded with fulsome praise, verbal and
written: “mitsve–tsetlekh” (mitzvah notes) written by mothers and
sent to (even pre–nursery age) children’s teachers for such behaviors
as a two–year old boy going to morning prayers with his father; marks
on charts and prizes for children (of both sexes) for sharing toys or
giving up a treat to others; designating girls who exhibit approved
behaviors (devotion in prayer, speaking respectfully, helping others,
not complaining), “girl of the month,” in school assemblies; chastising
less than ideal (withholding toys; tale bearing) or forbidden behavior
(talking back to a parent or teacher), as “goyish,” the product of Satan
(sutn) and the ever–threatening “evil inclination” (yayster–hure).
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Appropriate behavior for the respective sexes is encouraged in ways
that construct gender from the outset: groups of three–year old boys
praised as they bless their tsitsis (ritual undergarment) in the morning; preschool girls praised for neatness, for coloring inside the lines
of pictures of religious scenes (organization, neatness, and compliance
being crucial traits for girls, particularly as they reach marriage–age,
they are inculcated in them as early as childhood consciousness is attained, around the age of two and certainly by three). As Fader notes,
praise is a post–war Hasidic child–rearing and pedagogic innovation;
previously, wrong behavior was punished, but good behavior, expected, would not be noted.
Considering the primacy of compliance to the rule of authority (that
of parents, teachers, rabbis, the Rebbe, God), Fader rightly considers
how her informants handle defiance, or even asking questions outside
the bounds of acceptable thinking (God made the world, but who made
God?). She shows how certain forms of curiosity, but not others, are
cultivated: “good” questions receive full answers and praise; “bad”
ones are simply not answered, and if repeated, are chastised with the
threatened disapproval of parents, other revered family members and
teachers, or the community as a whole, with the threat of ultimate
social excommunication the worst possibility. As one of her informants
explained, a child who does not think becomes “an idiot,” certainly,
Fader paraphrases, “nothing to strive toward.” But “given the choice
between a child becoming an idiot or a heretic, any Hasidic parent
would choose the idiot.” (p. 67)
“What” questions are acceptable (what is shatnes?—the Biblically
forbidden mixing of wool and linen); “why” questions (why this rule?)
are suspect or out of bounds (a radical restriction, we note, of the
range of inquiry in classical rabbinical thinking expressed in even
such relatively popular sources are Biblical commentary, never mind
Jewish philosophical works). As a (Northeastern Yiddish–speaking)
inspirational speaker brought in to address a girls’ school put it, “ma
mame hot nit gefregt ken kashes. Emune iz simkhe”—“My mother did
not ask hard questions. Faith is happiness.” A firm, “we don’t do that,”
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and a refusal to discuss further are used to squelch unwanted inquiries
in the population Fader studies (she does not consider drop outs from
this society—those who leave Hasidism, Boro Park, even observance
altogether).
Hasidic girls who challenge authority threaten the very structure of
their society, which rests ultimately on acceptance of divine authority.
Gender first and, within it, age govern rules of respect and deference.
Those who accept this “natural” order resemble the “wise” child of
the Passover haggadah, whose intricate but informational question
earns acclaim. Those who do not resemble the “wicked” child whose
challenge–question earns excision. Gentiles, children are taught, ask
“selfish” questions and do not respect authority; Jews who do (and
not all do), deserve their special status as God’s People: following
the well–known midrash about the giving of the Torah, Fader’s informants stress that it was the Jews’ blind acceptance of God’s offer of
the Torah, alone among the nations, that earned them “chosenness.”
Accordingly, defiant children who do not respond to warnings and
epithets (khitspedik; mekhitsef— troublemaker); to leading and rhetorical questions (“can we say no to a teacher, a mother, a father?”);
to the parachute suggestion that their behavior was a “mistake;” to
incentives to make parents or teachers proud, or not cause them to be
“sad” and disappointed, are chastised as “goyim,” or “goyish,” one of
the worst epithets and an implicit threat that continued such behavior
will result in actual ejection to the “goyish” world. Peers are enlisted
to help bring about compliance. While tattling to humiliate people or
out of pettiness is labeled a sin, “telling on them in order to help them
be better Jews is fulfillment of a commandment. Children are taught
to be one another’s ‘policemen,’; helping them do the right thing.” (p.
77) Fader documents a tremendous level of social intimidation, a very
effective tool of achieving compliance with group norms in totalitarian
cultures, with which one might well class ultra–Orthodoxy.
Yet compliance, we would note, is not the only value Fader’s Hasidim
impart, since they also inculcate and, indeed, exist only because of
defiance: Hasidim, after all, resolutely and flagrantly reject the values
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of the majority culture, as well as other variants of Judaism, including
Modern Orthodoxy. In the US, they use the quintessentially modern,
liberal rhetoric of personal choice and autonomy to reject liberal modernity. Here, too, we see a far more complicated picture than the
common stereotype of Hasidism as fundamentalist throwback. Further
reflection on the meaning of boundaries of simultaneous defiance and
compliance, on both of which Hasidic society is founded and functions,
would be welcome.
Perhaps the most fascinating sections of the book are Fader’s chapters
on the languages the Hasidim create and use, and the extreme ways
that gender inflects speech and speech marks gender, as clear a delineation between women and men as their dress.
Hasidic Jews in Brooklyn have two spoken vernaculars: Hasidic English
and Hasidic Yiddish, as well as “loshn–koydesh”—the Hebrew (and Aramaic) of sacred study and prayer. Language, of course, is one of the
primary markers of group identity; with history, one of the basic components of separate national or in this case, minority group, identity.
Fader shows that Hasidic linguistic syncretism—their blurring of boundaries between Yiddish and English—creates distinctively Hasidic ways
of talking that “produce[s] essentialized differences between Jews and
Gentiles” (p.88) (as well as between Hasidic and most other Jews, the
vast majority of whom do not know Yiddish). She shows, however, that
Hasidic syncretic languages are also used to produce essentialized differences between Hasidic men and women: upon reaching school age,
girls are taught to use Hasidic English among themselves, while boys
are taught to use predominantly Hasidic Yiddish (as opposed to secular
Yiddish—that of “Yiddishists”: scholars of Jewish Eastern Europe, the
socialist Workmen’s Circle). For both females and males, the mode of
communication is Jewish, marking Hasidic separatism. But their respective Jewish languages mark the genders as distinct and different,
creating a sense of mutual, radical otherness between them, a difference experienced as natural and inherent. With sophisticated linguistic
analysis, Fader provides numerous examples of syncretic Yiddish English: me ken jumpn (you can jump); zol ikh fixn de hur? (should I fix
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your hair?); far vus men all of a sudden redn zayer shprakh? (why do
we all of a sudden speak their language?); so far vus redn azoy? (so
why are you talking like that?); ikh bin azoy proud fin Rukhy! (I am
so proud of Rukhy!) When Fader asks her informants if the sentence,
“ikh hob eym gezeyn fin across de street” (I saw him from across the
street), is Yiddish or English, they answer that it is Yiddish, because
the English words are Yiddishized in pronunciation: the ‘r’ of street is
flapped; the ‘ee’ if shortened (“strit”); ‘the’ is made ‘de.’ Thus, what
could be expressed readily in pure Yiddish—fin iber de gas—is made
English Yiddish.
The use of Yiddishized English is not just strategic; that is, serving
the obvious function of separatism. Fader shows that it flows from a
broader religious ideology (derived ultimately from kabbalistic categories that infuse Hasidism), of “raising” the holiness of ostensibly secular, or neutral, or even negative phenomena. By bringing Yiddish to
English, the latter is made holy; even pronouncing English words with
a Yiddish accent (“vire,” for “wire;” a Yiddishized pronunciation of the
Hasidic neighborhoods, “Bora Park” and “Vilyamsboorg”)—achieves this
purpose, making the profane—“the language of the Gentiles”—“faryidisht”—judaized. One of her informants even tells Fader that what
Jews did for German (bringing Yiddish into it), they are now doing
for English. Hasidic use of English has given certain words specifically
Hasidic meaning; e.g., “funny” (when written, transliterated in Hebrew
letters), means “interesting” in a derogatory way, that is, someone
who is not “normal,” especially someone who does not conform. Thus,
English words are not simply imported into Yiddish but are given
changed content to convey Hasidic ideas. As a result, the Yiddish of
Brooklyn Hasidim is so different than that of Israeli Hasidim, whose
Yiddish contains much contemporary Hebrew, that speakers of each
cannot understand one another, requiring the use of Hasidic English as
a better, if limited, alternative.
Hasidic English is the creation and language–base of female Hasidic
society. Hasidic Yiddish is used to communicate to all Hasidic babies
until the age of three, when gender distinction is introduced with boys’
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first hair cut (the upshern) in the pattern that marks ultra–Orthodox
men—closely shorn heads except for sidelocks—and boys are masculinized. Gender marking of boys means that girls too, are endowed
with gender. The universal use of Hasidic Yiddish for babies means that
girls, raised with it themselves and expected to use it with younger
siblings and eventually, their own children, are fluent in it. Once in
school, however, they learn other syncretic Hasidic languages: “loshn–
koydesh” and Hasidic English, as well Hasidic Yiddish, with questions
about proper boundary lines between the languages ongoing : is there
a Yiddish word for the color “peach,” for use in first–grade coloring,
or is the English word acceptable?—a question referred all the way to
the principal. After the age of three, mothers address sons in Hasidic
Yiddish but daughters in Hasidic English, a pattern girls replicate as
they mature, adapting their speech depending on the age and gender
of their interlocutors, while men (it is reported to Fader), speak Hasidic
Yiddish to sons and daughters alike. Boys speak Hasidic Yiddish only,
at least until a marriage or job requiring Hasidic English, which is then
acquired (Fader does not say how). In the home, boys often function
as language police, urging mothers to speak more, or only Yiddish,
effectively, we would note, a challenge to the gendered arrangement
that makes women engage more with the language of the secular
world, or at the very least, a behavior that makes them feel guilty, less
properly Jewish, for doing so, even as they are charged and socialized
to do just this (guilt inducement is also a powerful method of social
control in totalitarian cultures). Girls’ teachers, by contrast, do not
demand that mothers speak Yiddish exclusively to their daughters.
Dividing lines against the outside, general ones and ones specific to
gender, are elaborate. Hasidic society produces its own, highly didactic
board games for children (in a version of the game of Old Maid—whose
name is retained—the card to be avoided belongs to the yeitzer hora—
the evil inclination—who is gendered male (!), is ugly and deformed,
wears punk–style clothing and hair, carries weapons—and a computer—forbidden to Hasidim without special permission and supervision,
since it is a portal to pornography and other inappropriate content and
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connections. There is a whole children’s literature in Hasidic Yiddish,
from earliest reading through teenage girls’ tales, explicitly intended
to provide an alternative to teenage girls’ series in the secular world
(which educators and publishers are well aware of, as they are of the
ability of Hasidic girls to get hold of them). These books inculcate
values such as selflessness, as opposed to independence and self–realization. Thus is an all–encompassing culture created.
Despite all this, the lure of English is strong for the younger generation
and Fader shows girls’ mothers and grandmothers, many of whom
were not raised with Yiddish, tacitly supporting that link by speaking
Hasidic English at home. Rather than this expressing resistance to
religious stringency and cultural separatism, however, Fader finds that
it is linked to female awareness that women must be fluent in the language of the secular world in order to discharge their Hasidic mandate
there. Ironically, then, “girls’ participation in the heightened religiosity
that defines Hasidic continuity today” is enacted through loss of Yiddish fluency as they mature. “For males, however, Hasidic masculinity
carries religious authority buttressed by fluency in Yiddish and a
prestigious limited competence in English, both of which are linked to
men’s immersion in Torah study.” Thus, in a marked departure from
pre–war realities, Yiddish—“mame–loshn” (mother’s tongue)—has
been made “definitive of Hasidic masculinity.” This gendering of Yiddish
“represents a significant shift from pre–war Eastern Europe, where Yiddish was especially associated with women and ‘uneducated’ men who
did not know loshn–koydesh (pp.120–121)”—further indication that
post war American Hasidism is no mere carryover from a previous era
or from Europe, whatever Hasidim or outsiders with limited knowledge
about them, may claim.
Yiddish, which in pre–war Eastern Europe united millions of Jews
across a wide ideological spectrum, now separates Hasidic from the
vast majority of other Jews, as well as women from men. It also
situates women on a spectrum of more and less stringently Hasidic
practice: those who use only Yiddish (Satmar and other more extreme
Hasidic sects), and those who use Hasidic English, differences that
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also correlate to styles of dress and types of education among the
sects. The largely Bobover women Fader studied are critical both of
Satmar women to the right of them who do not know sufficient English
to navigate successfully in the outside world, whom they call “backward” and “primitive,” and those to their left, whom they consider
“too modern,” too much “like Gentiles,” because their English is not
sufficiently inflected with Yiddish. The balance the Bobover women
seek is expressed in their rejection of being “modern,” but in a simultaneous desire to be what they term, “with it.” (They thus adopt an
approach to those to the right of them, we would note, similar to that
with which Modern Orthodox Jews regard Hasidim.) In the process,
they produce a “distinctive Hasidic femininity that is increasingly stringent,” yet simultaneously, increasingly fluent in the secular world. This
seemingly counterintuitive rejection of overly Yiddishized behavior, in
speech but also in unfashionable hairstyles and dress (called “nebby”
and “neb”—a takeoff from the Yiddish “nebekh”—pathetic, inspiring
pity)—is as significant as their rejection of “modern” expressions.
Satmar hyper–Yiddishism, we might call it, is even seen as religiously
detrimental since, according to Fader’s informants, the Satmarer girl’s
and women’s minimal education and exposure makes them especially
susceptible to materialism and shallowness. Bobover “shtottiness,”
by contrast (from “shtot”—town), their cosmopolitan behavior, strikes
the correct balance, not “modern,” but “with it.” Much of the model for
“shtottiness” Bobov society obtains from the Orthodox but non–Hasidic
women teachers they hire to teach secular subjects in girls’ schools.
Yet a variety of family and communal messages convey that that
model—shorter, tighter skirts; longer wigs; Master’s degrees in Education—is not itself acceptable. Thus, Bobov girls and women negotiate
an elaborate, ongoing dialectic between influences to the right and the
left of them, producing a highly dynamic discourse about their choices
and developing traditions.
Fader concludes her book with chapters about Bobov attitudes to
physicality, modesty, marriage, and sex. Controls in these areas are
particularly crucial, since physical desires and expression, irrational by
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definition, have the power to explode social limits. Since women are
defined in this most androcentric of cultures as sex objects to men
(presumed to be heterosexual), it is crucial that girls learn to discipline
their bodies, voices, minds, and desires. It is for girls and women to
restrain their physical manifestation in the world, not for boys and men
to restrain themselves because, they are taught, males are less capable of self–control than females. Education to this end begins almost
from infancy. “Modesty” is a virtue for both genders (hence the black
and white sameness of male dress, the long sleeves and pants even
in hot weather, though arguably, ostentatious silk brocade caftans and
fur hats on Sabbath, holidays, and special occasions are anything but
modest), but it is an obsession for and about girls and women. No
hiking up dresses too high in jump rope (this is “crazy! Crazy!” one
teacher cries when she witnesses her charges doing this—in all–female
company, of course); no sheer stockings, violation of which is grounds
for expulsion from school. Contrary to what outsiders might expect,
“modesty” does not mean cultivating shyness or diffidence; Hasidic
society, after all, depends on women’s assertiveness. Nor does it preclude being fashionable or attractive, in approved ways; high heeled
shoes, lace, taffeta (albeit muted colors and in moderation), are “in”
and allowed at weddings.
Fader asks how Hasidic women’s culture succeeds in inculcating the
desire in girls to hew to the rules of modesty and finds, once again
that it is through negative characterization of Others who violate these
rules: Gentiles, but also other Orthodox women. Hasidic women are
not taught to deny all desire to look good, adorn themselves, attract
the right kind of attention; and modesty standards are recognized as
open to interpretation—which colors, fabrics (denim is “goyish”); what
skirt and sleeve length; which and how much makeup; what kind of
head covering for married women (to mark them as sexually exclusive
to their husbands, a requirement not imposed on husbands, for whom
only sex with another man’s wife is a cardinal sin): wig (and if so, what
kind, what length); kerchief; hat; turban; wig and hat? But like their
intellects and other desires, physical drives must be properly chan-
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neled and used to ennoble the self and to serve higher, religious ends.
In an extraordinary interpretive license that, one might think, would
earn anathematization, one woman analogized women‘s’ adherence to
modesty to men’s study of Torah (the latter, mandated in the Torah,
the highest degree of commandment): for them, it was a route to
divine reward just as sacred study is this route for men.
The rebbe as the pinnacle of male authority decrees modesty standards whose particulars are decreed on street posts and in schools and
vary by sect. “Tsnies” (modesty) is the focus of an elaborate ideology
asserting women’s allegedly superior ability to control their desires,
which is portrayed as proof of women’s innate spiritual superiority (in
which case, one wonders why it is not women who are charged with
community leadership and the Torah study that is a prerequisite for it,
an explosive question that Fader, perhaps understandably but lamentably, all the same, does not pose to her informants). It is for women to
restrain themselves so as not to distract (combustible) men; for them
to cross the street (one informant tells Fader that the streets, like the
synagogue, “belong to the men”), so as not to distract a passing Torah
scholar (even a youth), by so much as the clack of her heels on the
pavement. This self–effacement, too, is women’s contribution to the
furtherance of Torah study. It is simultaneously empowerment—one’s
heels clacking can cause a Torah scholar to lose control?–and monumental suppression/oppression. It is also an expression of the hyper–
sexualization in this world (and we would note, other cultures of extreme religion—Taliban, Iran under the mullahs, Saudi Arabia), where
the sheer manifestation of a woman’s physical being is deemed enough
to incite men’s (uncontrollable) lust. Whatever this culture makes of
women, its image of men is none too flattering either, although the
implications of the perceived weakness of men is hardly reflected in
the culture’s ultimate power structures.
Such attitudes necessarily carry over to girls’ feelings about their
physicality. Learning to repress themselves is marked as a sign of
maturity; Hasidic women defined becoming a “big girl” as having an
increasingly autonomous desire to conform to the family’s modesty

26 | VCU Menorah Review
conventions, which include not only dress but language, comportment,
and exposure to secular knowledge. Girls who expressed a desire to
participate in these forms earned fulsome praise; those who did not
were scolded and labeled as deviant (“crazy”). Thus, a first grader who
proudly told her teacher that she had volunteered to wear tights in the
summer rather than the knee socks her family’s conventions permitted
until girls reached second grade, won not only her mother’s praise, but
that of her teacher and the principal. Learning modest behavior is a
process, Fader shows, with training similar to that which girls receive
in other areas of religious practice. “From a very young age, mothers
pull their daughters dresses over their knees when they sit down,
teachers remind girls not to sit too [sprawled out] at their desks, and
older girls constantly remind their sisters not to let their skirts ride up
as they relax saying reprovingly, “Tsnies!”
There is much rote in this training, which begins around the age of
three, but also, Fader shows, an ideology to elaborate for Hasidic
girls “how Jews are different from Gentiles, creating the desire to be
a Jewish woman and the fear of resembling an uncontrolled Gentile.”
(p.158; my emphasis). The role of the Gentile—people and culture—is
enormous in this world. “Gentiles and the fear they inspire, particularly
in children,” Fader writes, “can be a powerful way to socialize the desire to be different.” This fear is evoked is just about every setting, but
perhaps above all about modesty. “Observing, imagining, and theorizing about what defines Gentile bodies and comportment by comparison
defines modest Jewish behavior for girls,” and so “with their immodest
ways,” Fader says, “goyim” sustain “Hasidic women’s claims to superiority and truth.”
Extremely binary thinking about Jews and Gentiles, Fader notes, extends to outright racism, with beliefs about a hierarchy of peoples and
a distinctive Jewish “soul,” which children expect to see embodied in
Jewish faces, as well as behaviors: if one of Fader’s informants sees a
girl behaving “nicely,” she wonders if she has Jewish relatives, though
she does also consider that the girl simply might be one of the “good
goyim”—admitting that such exist. But wild behavior typifies “goyim,”
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while “eydl” (noble) behavior typifies Jews, seen prototypically in the
Biblical brothers, Jacob and Esau, the model types of Jew and Gentile,
respectively, the one enacting the desired traits of piety and love of Torah; the other, greed, impatience, and wild submission to crass physical needs. “Eydl” behavior, however, while linked to a “Jewish” soul, is
not necessary and inevitable but the product of the larger disciplines of
the culture as well as self–discipline. “Self–control and a consciousness
of being a “ben–meylekh”—son of a king— the chosen nation. We’re
better than the goyim You’re more aristocratic. It’s about decency. It’s
about being a mentsh more than the goyim,” as one of her informants
puts it (p.160).
“Goyim,” Hasidic women teach girls, are incapable of controlling immodest desires, their “evil inclination” (yaytser hure)—a typification
that sounds remarkably similar to what is taught about Jewish men,
a point Fader, unfortunately, does not explore with readers or, what
would have been most interesting, with her informants. Gentiles—real
ones live on the borders of Boro Park and interspersed among Jews in
Williamsburg, and are often visible and audible on the streets, across
back yards— are the ever–present warning against the consequences
of failure to control wills and “cultivate Jewish souls,” with the help of
Torah, which Jews after all, but not Gentiles, have, the ultimate distinction between them. Fader cites the anthropologist, Jerome Mintz,
who describes a Hasidic man threatening his son that unless he follows
ritual norms, he will be a goy. “That’s the worst thing in the world,” the
man says. “His worst fear is he’s going to be a goy.” (p.161) For girls,
modesty is the greatest demarcation between female Jewishness and
Gentileness; Gentile girls flout their bodies shamelessly, have no behavioral boundaries, are “wild” (promiscuous, indiscriminate). Modest
Jewish girls by contrast, are literally, “noble”: Fader sees kindergarden
girls constructing paper crowns emblazoned with the words, “tsnies
iz man kroyn” (modesty is my crown), told by their teacher that their
modest Jewish souls make them royal, and to always walk as if they
had real crowns on their head, to remind the world that they are the
real princesses. If this reference is also a contrast to the anti–Jewish
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stereotype of the vulgar, materialistic “Jewish American Princess,” that
is, not just to “goyim” but to Jews who do not uphold pious standards
of behavior, we do not know. Goyish behavior, as noted, is not restricted to Gentiles.
Nor is modest behavior confined to dress; it governs speech too,
both volume and content. Expletives defile the tongue; screaming
violates Jewish “nobility” and weakens, as alternatively, good speech
and intonation strengthen, the Jewish soul. Very young children are
taught to discipline their speech: me redt nisht azoy, di kenst es zugn
in a shayne veyg? (we don’t talk like that. Can you say it in a nice
way?) While of course, parents in other cultures intervene similarly in
their children’s speech, in this culture, the intervention is religiously
mandated and infused and linked to the whole complex of behaviors,
thinking, and institutional structures that construct the Hasidic world.
To this world, “goyim” form the ever–present worst alternative. Thus,
a young boy is overheard using the “f” word and when asked by a
shocked mother where he learned it (the boy had no idea what it
meant, thinking it just meant stupid or silly), responded that he had
heard it in a game of shaygetz (!) (young Gentile male), from a friend
(a Hasidic boy, of course). The game is a version of cops and robbers
but here, the iconic bad guy is the Gentile; the scenario, Gentile–versus–Jew. The boy’s mother remarked that the friend must live on the
outskirts of Boro Park and have heard this word on streets dominated
by Gentiles. Just as Jews need to guard what they put in their mouths
(by the rules of kashrut), she tells her son, so they must guard what
comes out of them, in speech, raising this behavior to the level of
Biblically ordained mandate, on a par with the ritual diet, perhaps the
most fundamental demarcator of Jewish life from non–Jewish and Jews
from Gentiles. Similarly, Jewish girls are taught to contrast their “fine”
makeup, jewelry, dress, to the “crassness” of those of Gentile girls.
All this Fader notes, coexists with a fixation on jewelry and clothes,
particularly in the pre–marriage set (Boro Park has become an Orthodox shopping mecca), but for married women, as well, who one of
Fader’s informants told her, exceed women in Manhattan for elegance
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(despite—in her view, because of—their wigs and hats). Modesty then,
Fader points out in one of this book’s most important insights, is not
simply about self–deprivation or control of women. Hasidic girls and
women “use the disciplines of modesty to affect their everyday lives
by enjoying, in culturally and religiously appropriate ways, the pleasures of secular consumption, bodily adornment, and literacy. “They
legitimize their taste for fashion and finery with the rhetoric of Jewish
“nobility.” With its orientation of the self toward an outside agent,
discipline, Fader argues, citing Webb Keane, becomes an important
alternative to liberal models of agency. For the women of Bobov Hasidism, who navigate between secular manifestations and their Jewish,
Hasidic base (unlike “nebby” Hasidic women), the discipline of modesty
becomes a way to collapse distinctions portrayed as oppositional, in
this case, the demands of piety and the desire to look good according
to reigning secular standards. In their practice, “these desires complement each other, challenging the liberal belief that the sacred and the
secular, the spiritual and the material, the body and the soul, need be
oppositions at all.” (p.178)
Girls particularly engage the lures and dangers of the “goyish” world
because of their mandate to enter and navigate that world. Concerted
attention, therefore, is given to countering the subversive effects of
this contact, by labeling, e.g., the same English–language (heavily
censored) fiction that girls are allowed, even required, to read in
school as deficient, compared to the religiously–themed, Jewish literature that Hasidic presses turn out. Schools work to limit girls’ leisure
time reading choices, forbidding, for instance, visits to public libraries—a ban, Fader notes without comment, that many families ignored
(defiance whose meaning and dimensions merit further investigation).
She notes, moreover, that girls independently obtain books they know
are contraband, setting off book bag searches at schools.
But the outside world imposes unavoidably. Even if they refrain from
using headsets on airplanes, images of immodest dress, of male–female romance, loom on the screens of others. Ads on the sides of
buses convey images of beautiful men and women in underwear, in
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embrace. Hence, the imperative of evoking autonomously directed
self–discipline in the younger generation and of instituting self–regulating peer mechanisms of social control: girls are taught not only to
challenge friends who may be violating norms, but to do so effectively
(without humiliating them, which is not only a sin but counterproductive). Desire, however, also comes from within: girls at (of course,
all–girl) summer camp who defy rules and do not cover up with robes
and stockings (!) as soon as they leave the swimming pool, because
they want a whole–body tan.
Actual or even contemplated defiance meets a potent counterforce
in late adolescence, when girls reach marriageable age and face the
rigors of scrutiny in the arranged marriage market: modesty is sine
qua non for a good match. Enhanced modesty betters one’s prospects
so girls and even the rest of their families often move up a modesty
notch in their dress to attract a desirable match, or agree in premarital
negotiations between the families for the girl to adopt a more stringent
type of dress or head covering than is her family’s custom, in order to
seal a desirable deal. This enhancement of Hasidic behavior can also
better the marriage prospects of younger siblings, all of which necessarily filters “down” to educate girls about the benefits of compliance
and “autonomous” adoption of stringent norms, and the equally significant consequences of defying them. Because, next to expulsion to the
“goyish” world, the worst that can happen to a girl is failure to land a
good match, life alone, without family and the manifold social placements that come from having a husband and children and re–creating
in one’s own life the norms one has been raised to perpetuate.
Marriage is a critical, make–or–break, event not only in the lives of
the partners but their families, with major social and economic implications. Not marrying is an immeasurable tragedy and disruption of
communal rhythms. Even delaying marriage raises doubts about and
seriously harms an individual’s marriageability: past a certain age,
there is no approved social category of single people; by age 25, a
single person is considered damaged goods and will have difficulty
getting a match, considered “material” only for someone similarly
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“damaged,” whether by age or illness, physical and/or mental (“he’s a
little funny and she’s a little slow—perfect match,” says one of Fader’s
informants).
Accordingly, by the end of high school, girls move into the marriage
market, under pressure to nail a good match in a small window of
time when the best prospects are most plentiful, before they have
been snatched by others, and the circumstances (their own youth
and freshness on the market) are most advantageous. Each person
is understood to have a “bashert,” one intended for her or him, but
finding the “bashert” takes expert mediation, usually by professional
matchmakers, that takes into account many variables that give candidates a ranking and eligibility rating in the highly competitive marriage market. Not just obvious things, like whether there is rabbinic
ancestry, are considered, but whether there is disease in the family,
especially, mental illness, or divorce. Even the death of a candidate’s
parent marks one a notch down. The analogy with royalty, clearly, is
more than metaphorical.
Some lines of investigation are gender differentiated, with girls investigated for looks, type of education, choice of friends, personality
(quiet? gregarious—but not inappropriately so?), modesty, household
skills and efficiency. Investigation of a candidate’s background and
behavior is rigorous, with teachers, neighbors, even in one case Fader
cites, the family butcher, consulted about character and behavior, and
both sets of parents must first assign a high grade for a (chaperoned)
introduction to occur. Hasidic society is extremely status conscious,
with complex hierarchies based on family background (yikhes, or lack
thereof), wealth, and occupation that decide an individual’s market
value, about which Fader provides detailed analysis and an informative
Table (“Categories of Hasidic Families”).
However secular or modern Orthodox readers may view these patterns, Hasidim have an equal critique of marriage (or caricatures
of marriage) in Gentile or secular families, in line with their larger
critiques of those worlds: secular marriage is about selfish indulgence
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of passion; individuals and their limited personal horizons rather than
families and community; fleeting present rather than past and future;
personal gratification rather than commitment to larger purposes. Here
too, as in the other ways that this fundamental difference between
contemporary Hasidism and the larger culture is expressed, Hasidism levels a moral challenge to secular modernity that is not easily
dismissed. Even the system of vetting prospective partners would in
essence if not in all particulars, seem a cogent alternative to the rash
partnering and unpartnering that marks secular society. As one of Fader’s informants notes, anyone can be on good behavior on a date. Why
would parents not care enough to check into whom their children are
marrying, contributing to this most crucial decision from their greater
life experience and perspective?
Hasidic brides take formal classes in which they not only learn the
rules of “family purity” (which require that during menstruation and
for a week after, not just sexual abstinence but the cessation of any
physical contact or even endearing words between wife and husband,
lest these lead to sex). They are lectured about the meaning of Jewish
marriage and sexuality as vehicles for elevation of desire to holiness.
In this arena too, Hasidic culture appropriates the discourse of secular
culture but molds it to Hasidic purposes. Hasidic brides are taught that
adherence to “family purity” will yield them not just the romantic love,
but friendship and intimacy with husbands unknown and unknowable
in the secular/ “goyish” world. Here too, then, religious discipline is
said to come not at the expense of personal fulfillment, but alongside
and, indeed, activating and actualizing it. Secular values are not denied; they are claimed and refashioned, using moral and psychological
values upheld in the secular world.
Given the emphasis on modesty to the point even of valorizing distancing from one’s own body—Fader overheard Bobov girls proudly
telling their mothers that they had learned to don clothing underneath
their nightgowns, avoiding the sight of their own nakedness—and the
absence of all physical contact between the couple, who may meet
once or twice before becoming engaged, the transition to marriage
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and sexual activity is sudden and radical. Brides attend weeks of “kale”
(bride) classes (and men, “khusn,” groom, classes, the latter, usually
short–duration, one–on–one sessions with a rabbi), in which some
learn about sex for the first time, with some, of both sexes, fainting at
the news of what they are expected to do, in general, and with total
strangers when they have spent their lives hiding from the sight of
even their own nakedness (albeit, not the camp girls who want a whole
body tan), and avoiding even eye contact with others of the opposite
sex. Why teach such things before they are of practical use, the reasoning goes, when it would only serve as a harmful distraction, an invitation, even, to forbidden behavior? Fader herself was a bride during
part of her field work and was able to attend a “kale” class (albeit only
for the more moderate Hasidic elements, and in more modern Flabush,
not Boro Park; parents in the latter did not consent to her presence,
as a non–initiate, in “kale” classes), and speak with brides–to–be
and their teachers. This provided an invaluable perspective that likely
yielded richer, fuller information about this sensitive area than would
likely have been the case had she and her informants not shared this
status—or had Fader not shared this information about herself with her
informants, with some of whom, mutual friendships developed.
In this critical area, too, perhaps especially, we see Hasidic society
responding to awareness of secular models: the Torah way held up as
a route to holiness and personal satisfaction. Blind obedience of the
rules of “family purity,” as in other areas, was not the message; “elevation” of ideals upheld in the modern, secular world—intimacy, desire,
pleasure—was (though bottom–line, we would note, conformity to the
rules is required, whether or not one agrees with the rationalization
given them, something Fader’s informants know very well). Torah
practices became a “civilizing discourse that disrupted the liberal oppositions of nature and culture, the primitive and the civilized” (p.203),
teaching the practice of both romantic and platonic love in marriage
(see p.204 for the especially creative, indeed, brilliant metaphor
that Fader’s teacher presented her students—some of whom did ask
pressing questions about the “cold and depressing” strictures of family
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purity—indicating that they anticipate enjoying both physical and emotional intimacy).
Along with reference to the ideals of love and intimacy shared with
secular culture was the ubiquitous derogatory comparison with “Gentile” norms—the “warped” absence of modesty; sexuality and lust
flaunted on the streets and in coarse, explicit language; behavior
empty of meaning and eventually, even of passion. On the other
Gentile extreme, the Christian (actually, as Fader notes, just the Catholic) norm, was castigated for treating sex as dirty, with the highest
ideal (exemplified by priests), being abstinence and celibacy. Jewish
practice, by contrast, kales were taught, recognizes sexual needs
as natural, legitimate, and potentially holy—with the ability to make
it holy largely in their hands. That practice, paradoxically or not, we
would note, also vastly expands the realm of the erotic by eroticizing
seemingly insignificant, mundane acts, like a wife pouring juice for her
husband, not likely to be a signifier in any other context but in this
lifestyle, a message that she is “pure” and sexually available after her
time of separation. Even the lack of attractiveness is eroticized in this
system: a woman who returns from the ritual bath which ends her
time of sexual withdrawal is without makeup or fine hair adornment
(wet hair is bad for wigs), yet precisely these looks signal sexual availability to husbands, who respond accordingly.
This area more than any other in Hasidic life (and observant Jewish
practice altogether), depends on autonomous compliance of women,
since as Fader’s kale

teacher pointed out to her students, “no one

checks on you. This is between you and God.” The cycles of sexual
access and withdrawal are in women’s hands and at their discretion: it
is the wife who tells the husband when she is or is not “pure” (though
in case of doubt—blood spot or not?—the wife is to take her underwear
or the cloth used to swab internally for blood before going to the mikve
for judgment by a rabbi who specializes in menstrual blood, a practice
that would seem to violate modesty most outrageously, and which
anecdotal evidence the kale teacher herself cites, is sometimes—?
often?— defied). Here too, reality confounds simplistic depictions of
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women as mere pawns in the control of men. For, we would note, it is
the male system—not just Hasidic, much less only the variant Fader
studies, but rabbinic, going back to the earliest law codes—that empowers women this way, putting them, not men, in control of sexual
access, a feature of this patriarchal system that profoundly perplexes
this reviewer).
Fader sets out to make a significant case using an innovative focus
and conceptual apparatus and succeeds, contributing to several significant areas of scholarship and yielding many fascinating insights.
Her findings have complicated and troubling cultural and societal implications. While secular or even Modern Orthodox readers might find
much of what Fader depicts objectionable—surely the racism and the
proto–racism, however modified, contradictory, and inconsistent these
(mercifully) may be—no group identity is possible without distinct
behaviors and line drawing against other collective behaviors, and such
distinctions are not possible or at least, not tenable in the long term,
without some hierarchical value system that deems the group’s behaviors superior. The Bobov variant of this may seem extreme to those
outside of their society, but it is a question of where on the continuum
one falls. The critique of mindless materialism and consumerism, of
hedonistic indulgence, in the name of higher, more enduring values
and the sacredness of intimacy is one that others share, and like the
Bobover, can make meaningful only through the enactment of very
different norms for consumption and partnering than those in much
of contemporary Western society. Those with liberal (or conservative)
political values, who espouse vegetarianism or the environment, or
oppose abortion rights—also fall on a continuum of demonizing those
who do not share their commitments and of extolling their choices
and lifestyle as superior, and tend to choose the society of others who
share their views. While one might well argue for alternatives other
than both those of the “secular” culture (an enormous generalization
that Fader does not deconstruct) and those of Bobov (these are after
all not the only alternatives available, a polarity the Bobovers erect
but which hardly represents the range of social reality in New York,
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the U.S.—never mind the world), the need to establish and defend
the superiority of chosen lines necessarily creates some of the same
dynamics that critics of Fader’s informants might articulate.
Drafting women to carry the burden of constructing this society’s
boundaries and its internal meaning and messages is a very complicated phenomenon. Women in this society are simultaneously subordinated and derogated—colonized—and empowered, given roles of
great value and astonishing latitude to elaborate and enact systems
of meaning. Clearly, despite my curiosity, expressed above, posing
this and related questions to her informants in this project would have
compromised Fader’s ethnographical methods. Perhaps her future work
will probe some of these paradoxes and complications.
1. On this, see my “Ritual,” in Jewish Women in America, An Historical
Encyclopedia, Paula E. Hyman and Deborah Dash Moore, eds. (New
York: Routledge, 1997), II:1150–1155.
2. See my Introduction to Pauline Wengeroff, Memoirs of a Grandmother, Scenes from the Cultural History of the Jews of Russia in
the Nineteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010),
52–61.
Dr. Shulamit S. Magnus, associate professor of Jewish studies and
history at Oberlin College,is the winner of the 2010 National Jewish
Book Award’s Barbara Dobkin Award for Pauline Weingeroff’s Memoires
of a Grandmother: Scenes from the Cultureal History of the Jews of
Russia in the Nineteenth Century, Volume One. She is also a contributing editor.
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Jews in the Shaping of Modern Capitalism
A review essay by Steven Windmueller
Capitalism and the Jews by Jerry Z. Muller. Princeton University
Press
In a relatively compact book, the reader is introduced to the story of
Jews and capitalism by economic historian Jerry Muller.
Professor Muller posits that “to understand modern European and Jewish history” one needs to appreciate the historical relationship between
capitalism and Jews. Unfortunately, this book simply does not achieve
this outcome. This text can best be described as a brief overview of
some of the core themes that might define this connection. Beyond
this point, this work is disappointing in its lack of depth and content.
Surprisingly, his endnotes are often more informative and useful than
the body of his material.
The author sets out to explore how both the world of religion (namely
Christianity) and of governments reacted to the role of Jews within
the economic order. Where Jews were accepted in more liberal nation–
state systems, they flourished within the capitalistic model. Where and
when they were rejected, Jews sought to embrace alternative economic ideologies, including socialism and communism. An additional
response involved the notion that unless Jews had their own nation–
state, they would remain “the other”; thus, the Zionist enterprise was
seen as another expression of their status in the world. But in none
of these arenas, does Muller do justice to the historical, economic or
political issues associated with these respective categories.
What Muller does capture are elements of the relationship between
some of the core ideas that have shaped modern capitalism and the
impact of these principles on Jewish economic behavior. He specifically
accomplishes elements of his goal in two specific areas. His historic
overview on the theme of usury is useful and informative. In this context Professor Muller’s analysis of church policy and early philosophical
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thinking about monetary notions are particularly illuminating.
Secondly, his background analysis on the works of Georg Simmel and
Werner Sombart represents one of the stronger elements to this manuscript. Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money and Sombart’s two primary
contributions, Modern Capitalism and The Jews and Economic Life
shed some fascinating and useful insights on the theoretical principles
aligning Jews with the capitalist enterprise. Correspondingly, Mueller’s
analysis of John Maynard Keynes’ contributions to this discourse along
with his brief references to the writings of Frederick Hayek’s Road to
Serfdom and The Constitution of Liberty offer some important insights
into the engagement of Jews with capitalism.
Hayek’s notions about capitalism, as interpreted by Muller, suggests
the following: “The economic vibrancy created a social and cultural
dynamic, demanding the adaptation of old ways of thinking and behaving.” For Hayek, Jews portrayed the necessary cultural characteristics
that were seen as essential for “competitive capitalism”.
As Muller seeks to point out that the enemies of capitalism attempted
over time whether under Nazism or Communism to identify Jews with
the evils and failings of the capitalist system. Citing Osama Bin Laden’s
“Letter to America” in 2002, the author notes how even radical Islam
seeks to align Jews with the capitalistic system: “ the Jews have taken
control of your economy, through which they have then taken control
of your media, and now control all aspects of your life making you
their servants and achieving their aims at your expense.”
In some measure, Jerry Muller’s focus on Jewish involvement with the
world of Communism and the former Soviet Union seems to take away
from his core thesis and focus on the engagement of Jews with capitalism. His attention to the 20th century, and more directly the American
experience, is totally absent from these pages. In light of the contributions made by American Jews to this nation’s economic enterprise,
this book falls far short in capturing that significant and essential story.
Further and somewhat surprising, this writer ignores the past and
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recent events involving ponzi schemes and other indiscretions, where
Jews have been specifically identified.
The subject matter is simply too complex to be condensed into a 200
page volume. Had the author elected to identify this work as focusing
on some of the core issues associated with Jews and capitalism than
such a volume would garner greater credibility. In its present form, the
author simply fails to achieve what the title and his introduction seek
to project.
Dr. Steven Windmueller is the Rabbi Alfred Gottschalk Emeritus Professor of Jewish Communal Service at Hebrew Union College–Jewish
Institute of Religion, Los Angeles campus, and contributing editor.
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Moreshet: From The Classics
A Theological–Political Treatise, Chapter 3 — By Baruch Spinoza
That [the Jewish people] have been preserved in great measure by
Gentile hatred, experience demonstrates. When the king of Spain
formerly compelled the Jews to embrace the State religion or exile, a
large number of Jews accepted Catholicism.
Now, as these renegades were admitted to all the native privileges of
Spaniards, and deemed worthy of filling all honorable offices, it came
to pass that they straightway became so intermingled with the Spaniards as to leave of themselves no relic or remembrance. But exactly
the opposite happened to those whom the king of Portugal compelled
to become Christians, for they always, though converted, lived apart,
inasmuch as they were considered unworthy of any civic honors.
The sign of circumcision is, as I think, so important, that I could persuade myself that it alone would preserve the nation forever. Nay, I
would go so far as to believe that if the foundations of their religion
have not emasculated their minds they may even, if occasion offers, so
changeable are human affairs, raise up their empire afresh, and that
God may a second time elect them.
Of such a possibility we have a very famous example in the Chinese.
They, too, have some distinctive mark on their heads which they most
scrupulously observe, and by which they keep themselves apart from
everyone else, and have thus kept themselves during so many thousand years that they far surpass all other nations in antiquity. They
have not always retained empire, but they have recovered it when lost,
and doubtless will do so again after the spirit of the Tartars becomes
relaxed through the luxury of riches and pride.
Lastly, if any one wishes to maintain that the Jews, from this or from
any other cause, have been chosen by God for ever, I will not gainsay
him if he will admit that this choice, whether temporary or eternal,
has no regard, in so far as it is peculiar to the Jews, to aught but do-
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minion and physical advantages (for by such alone can one nation be
distinguished from another), whereas in regard to intellect and true
virtue, every nation is on a par with the rest, and God has not in these
respects chosen one people rather than another.
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New Approaches to Gender and Feminism: Jewish
Philosophical Perspectives
A review essay by Rochelle L. Millen
Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, edited by Hava Tirosh–Samuelson, Indiana University Press.
Culled from presentations made at a 2001 conference held at Arizona
State University, the essays in this volume explore significant facets of
the intersection of Jewish and feminist philosophy. In her introduction,
the conference organizer and editor, Hava Tirosh–Samuelson, relates
how the conversation regarding the confluence of these disciplines
began with a 1986 essay by Heidi Ravven titled “Creating a Jewish
Feminist Philosophy.” But the feminism that has indeed transformed
contemporary Judaism since the 1970s has focused upon the theological and hermeneutical rather than the more narrowly philosophical.
Authors such as Judith Plaskow, Rachel Adler, Judith Romney–Wegner,
Rochelle L. Millen, and Judith Hauptman, among others, reframe issues in rabbinic texts, examining their content and context through a
feminist lens. Without analyzing the counterpoint of rabbinic texts and
Jewish philosophy, one might claim that Tamar Ross in her analysis of
the impact of R. Kook’s philosophy of history upon Jewish feminism
is among the few thinkers who assess the issues from a more strictly
philosophical framework.
The essays in this volume continue the conversation between Jewish
philosophy and feminism begun by Ravven in 1986 and extended by
Tirosh–Samuelson in her 1994 article, “Dare to Know: Feminism and
the Discipline of Jewish Philosophy.” They cover a broad range of philosophical themes and while of high quality, vary in their precision of
analysis. A positive aspect to the work is its lack of consensus, its exploration of nuance and complexity. Some contributors articulate discomfort with feminist philosophy, while others see Jewish philosophy
as a possible enriching corrective to feminist philosophy. Undergirding
this diversity of viewpoints are various ways of construing just what
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feminist philosophy and Jewish philosophy are, questions of definition
that continue to invite discussion. The interested reader will find much
to ponder and will gain from the presentation of new perspectives. In
order to convey this diversity and nuance, I have chosen to comment
in detail on five of the twelve essays, briefly mention the others, and
conclude with some general remarks.
Sarah Pessin’s “Loss, Presence, and Gabirol’s Desire: Medieval Jewish
Philosophy and the Possibility of a Feminist Ground” opens Part I, “Re–
reading Jewish Philosophers.” Trained in medieval Jewish philosophy,
Pessin affirms the well–known conception in classical Greek philosophy, that “the feminine” indicates passivity, loss, and the negation of
goodness. From the pre–Socratics through Plato and Aristotle, “the
feminine”, although acknowledged as nurturer, is consistently defined
as weak, obedient, and mired in matter rather than characterized by
rationality. Pessin sets as her task the attempt to redeem “the feminine” from its negative connotations in medieval Jewish philosophy
through an examination of the thought of Solomon Ibn Gabirol.
Ibn Gabirol’s philosophy of matter serves as the means for his transvaluation of “the feminine.” Pessin demonstrates that Gabirol praises
the material, pairing it with Divine essence and therefore giving
positive value to the heretofore passive realm of the material. From
its earlier low status, materiality becomes the very focus of Divine
Essence itself. For Gabirol (feminine) receptivity, clothed in eros replaces (masculine) power “in the estimation of the highest existential
possibility of human being” (Pessin, 28). The feminine thus comes to
represent not loss, but presence, both of the human and the Divine.
Pessin makes clear that “finding a feminist ground” in Gabirol’s metaphysics does not make him a feminist. She discusses neither women
nor misogynistic assumptions. Rather, Pessin claims that Gabirol’s
analysis “signals a rupture” (Pessin 29) in medieval philosophical
thinking by reconfiguring “the feminine” as presence rather than loss.
While Gabirol, in the tradition of Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle and Philo
does articulate “the feminine” as privation, Neoplatonism leads to his
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developing the notion of a higher level of matter, a sublime kind of materiality. It is this conception of the highest grade of matter that offers
the opportunity to prioritize and privilege the passivity of the material,
and thus of “the feminine.”
In Gabirol’s gradations of matter, materiality is the means through
which God connects to God’s essence. Thus, as Pessin notes “Gabirol creates a conceptual space in which matter trumps form” (Pessin
39). From the usual identification of matter with negation, passivity,
and evil, matter here becomes the very correlation of the Divine
Essence. It is fascinating that Gabirol voices this in language later
incorporated into Kabbalah. The material in the Divine is “hidden,” as
both matter and God are hidden aspects of reality. God’s nature, that
is, is revealed through its concealment, just as the nature of matter is
concealed in its being revealed.
Gabirol’s privileging of the material—its receptivity and eros —create a
novel axiology, one in which masculine desire–for–power–over is less
significant that the passive feminine yearning for presence and becoming. Desire–for–completion trumps desire–for power, leading to a
“willingness to engage the self through an engagement with the other”
(Pessin 40) His philosophy creates a new and different hierarchy, one
in which Aristotle’s view of matter as negation and the source of evil
is transformed. Through its potential for receptivity, matter, as the
source of eros, is the center of human engagement and culture. From
“the feminine” sprouts the totality of life, the most fundamental and
deepest human truths.
Idit Dobbs–Weinstein’s “Thinking Desire in Gersonides and Spinoza”
continues Pessin’s reassessment of the status of matter in the history
of philosophy, although with a sharper bite. Weinstein argues that
feminist philosophy generally accepts the mind/body dualism, which
results in a devaluing of the physical. Through examining the thought
of Gersonides and Spinoza, Weinstein claims that “feminist philosophy
can be transformed from an abstract critique of dualism, or anti–dualism, to a concrete mode of a–dualist philosophizing” (Weinstein 56).
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Weinstein asserts a blindness at the core of feminist philosophies, one
which accepts “the canonical authority which they question and the fathers whose recognition they seek” (Weinstein 59) and gives examples
of what she terms “reticent” feminist readings of the canon. In this
category she includes Luce Irigaray’s reading of Plato’s Symposium,
Judith Butler on Spinoza, and Cathy Carruth on Freud.
For Spinoza, “the mind is nothing but the idea of the body” (Weinstein
70), and prejudices, which hold powerful affects, form obstacles which
even rational demonstrations cannot weaken... The qualities attributed
to God, for instance—despite contradictory experience, are maintained
by elaborate human mythologies and explanations. The issue of what
Weinstein terms “prejudice,” for Spinoza, is political, since religion is
central to the rule of law.
Weinstein considers questions regarding the use of gender categories
as “anachronistic” (Weinstein 74), wishing instead to explore how—and
if—Jewish philosophy encourages thinking about the philosophical
canon “against the grain.” The brief consideration of Gersonides and
Spinoza exemplies her claim that religion and politics are complicit in
oppression. Similarly to Pessin, Weinstein wishes to recover a materialist theory of knowledge as the means to undermine the dualism in
Western—especially Christian—philosophy. Politics cannot be based on
an abstract human being, separate from her/his natural, physical self.
In the seeds of democratic thinking sown by Spinoza, Weinstein finds
positive value for both feminist and Jewish philosophy.
A different perspective is articulated in Leora Batnitsky’s “Dependency
and Vulnerability: Jewish and Feminist Existential Construction of
the Human.” Batnitsky’s aim is to describe how Martin Buber, Franz
Rosenzweig, and Emanuel Levinas define what it means to be human
and how their Jewish existentialist thinking compares with that of
“women centered” feminist philosophy, especially feminist philosophies
of care. By the latter, Batnitsky refers specifically to those who argue
that aligning “women,” “the feminine,” and “mothering” is not reactionary. Rather, such interconnection transforms not only feminist, but also
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moral and political thinking. She argues—quite astutely—that these
Jewish existentialists share three notions with feminist philosophies
of care. They work to develop a concept of the self who is vulnerable
and dependent on others and not wholly autonomous. They suggest
that responsibility and ethics grow out of this dependency. And they
designate dependence and our response to vulnerability as “feminine.”
Contemporary feminist philosophy can then help us understand the
use of gendered terms in Jewish philosophy. In essence, the philosophical accounts of the human as dependent are “philosophically and
politically valuable” (Batnitsky 128). They insist that relationality is the
foundation from which all else evolves. Levinas, for instance, insists
that the passive capacity in the human being, “the feminine,” is the
source of ethics.
While Buber famously maintains mutuality and reciprocity as hallmarks
of the dialogical I–Thou relationship, Levinas takes a more radical
stance. For him, ethics derive from relationship precisely because of
its assymetry. Indeed, Levinas criticizes Buber precisely for the emphasis upon mutuality, insisting that ethics emerges from a one–sided
responsibility for the Other. The Levinasian dialogical relationship is not
reciprocal. It is also non–cognitive; “Relation itself...differs from knowledge,” Levinas writes (Quoted in Batnitsky, 131).
“The feminine,” for Levinas, is thus non–reciprocal and non–cognitive. Barnitsky sees this definition as part of Levinas’s lament against
what he terms “the totalizing” propensities of modern culture. “The
feminine” resists seeking the universal much as Judaism, according
to Levinas, emphasizes the particular, in contrast to Greek thinking.
Batnitsky analyzes in detail several works of Levinas, drawing conceptual parallels between Levinas’s theory of ethics and various feminist
philosophies of care. For instance, she shows how Levinas’s conception
of “the feminine” accords with Carol Gilligan’s description of “women’s
morality.” For Gilligan, women define themselves in the context of relationships and judge themselves in terms of the ability to care. Woman
is both creator and nurturer of the web of human relationships. Such
a web spawns moral conundra different from the universal rule orien-
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tation written about by those such as Lawrence Kohlberg, whose ideas
originally challenged Gilligan to rethink “women’s morality.” Levinas
would agree that the varied and manifold tasks of mothering give
rise to ethical dilemmas quite distinct from those of the universal vs.
self–interest, the Western, male–oriented, Kantian–influenced format.
Instead, the many demands of mothering compel women to weigh
the claims of one self–other relationship against another; to balance,
reconcile, accommodate, satisfy, and act. Thus ethics are seen as
infinite—the constant juggling of priorities in relationships—and action
oriented. Batnitsky quotes Levinas’s words about what it means to be
oriented by and toward ethics, which for Levinas are always understood in material, concrete form. Ethics, he states, “is to give to the
Other...a gift of my own skin” (Quoted in Batnitsky, 134). Levinas’s
stress on the material correlates with both feminist and Jewish ethics,
and echoes Pessin’s analysis of Gabirol. He insists that human effort
must be channeled toward maintaining and encouraging the flourishing
of an ethic of care.
Some have argued—correctly, I believe—that the emphasis in Western
philosophy on moral autonomy leads to the privatization of women’s
experience and, as in Kohlberg, the exclusion of that experience from
the accepted moral compass. In Western moral thinking, a la Kant and
Rawls, the moral agent is a disembodied self–activated by reason and
the abstract concept of justice. Levinas, as a modern Jewish philosopher, thus connects “the feminine” with caring and the good, rather
than with rationality and justice. He reconfigures Judaism and “the
feminine” into an interpersonal ethic, which can neither be private nor
based solely upon abstract principles, both aspects of Western philosophical notions, but must rather have a public, material (embodied)
dimension focused on the good.
Investigating the theological background of Levinas’s use of “the feminine ”in his ethics, Batnitsky finds its roots in Rosenzweig’s arguments
about the relationship between Judaism and Christianity. This is an
unexpected—and tenuous—connection, which she summarizes this
way:
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“Levinas represents the ethical obligation to the other as the eternal
mark of humanity while Rosenzweig describes the Jewish People as
themselves living this timeless ethic for the sake of others” (Quoted
in Batnitsky, 138). This is a creative, insightful analysis. In Batnitsky’s
paraphrase, “A woman embodies natural openness to the supernatural
realm of love, just as Jews embody in their love God’s revelation to
them” (Batnitsky 140). Most disconcerting, however, is how Rosenzweig characterizes “Jewish blood.” Rosenzweig’s understanding of
Judaism as a “blood community” fits the prevalence of eugenics in the
1920s, but surely jars when one confronts it in the twenty–first century! The same can be said for Levinas and Rosenzweig when they both
justify and laud Hermann Cohen’s concept of exile and homelessness
as part of the Divine plan for Jews and Judaism.
Batnitsky concludes that engaging Jewish existentialist configurations
of “the feminine” is useful for both feminist philosophy and moral
thinking. Buber, Rosenzweig and Levinas articulate innovative perspectives in philosophy and ethics from within a canon largely Christian and
often anti–Jewish. After carefully laying out the value of “the feminine,”
she inquires rather unexpectedly: “When does the notion of ‘the feminine’ do more damage that it does critical work?” She responds that
Buber, Rosenzweig, and Levinas’s use of “the feminine”, despite their
best intentions, does tend to relegate women to the traditional roles of
homemaker and mother. But is this so? Does writing of “the feminine”
in traditional categories necessarily preclude independence, autonomy,
and egalitarianism? From a philosophical perspective, I would respond,
“not necessarily.” It seems to me that Judaism, as well as feminist
philosophers of care, emphasize what I would call practical or reasoned
ethics. The system of mitzvoth (commandments) creates internal
awareness as well as external discipline. But this system requires
knowledge of how to be virtuous and act ethically. Perhaps this is best
seen by the question posed in BT Kiddushin: which is greater, study
of Torah or the doing of (practical acts of) goodness? A system which
weds learning to action so intricately surely can be egalitarian.
Enlightening and challenging as is this essay, it concludes on a surpris-
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ing note. Batnitsky suggests in her closing paragraph that the philosophy of Hermann Cohen can enhance that of these Jewish existentialists
in a way that leads to greater balance. She points to Cohen’s stress
upon hesed, or loving–kindness, a rationalized virtue that balances the
pre–reflective ethic of Levinas. But one doesn’t need Hermann Cohen
to have an emphasis on hesed, as it is found throughout the rabbinic
corpus. Indeed, that corpus is the very foundation for the work of
these thinkers. Turning to Cohen—especially since his anti–Zionism
and neo–Kantianism can be problematic—seems lame. It is a weak
conclusion to an otherwise stimulating essay.
The very structure of Suzanne Last Stone’s essay, “Feminism and the
Rabbinic Concept of Justice”, conveys the complexity and subtlety of
her subject: an analysis of rabbinic sources that deals with the tension
between justice and mercy, both Divine and human, and the relation
of that tension to gender imagery. Last Stone’s work traverses the
boundaries between the philosophical, exegetical, legal, and the feminine/feminist aspect of each. She distills this theme in the literature
from two perspectives. First, she examines the emotional framework
supporting the legal concepts of justice and mercy in rabbinic thinking. Second, she explores the sources as a “window onto the role of
the feminine in rabbinic tradition.” Writing with great clarity, she sees
her essay as “a response to the challenge of Jewish legal philosophy
to take gender categories seriously in thinking through how the law
historically has been shaped and what shape the law may take in the
future” (Last Stone 263). This is a large task indeed.
Feminism has led to new inquiries revolving around sex and gender in
legal issues and jurisprudence. One question emphasizes the effect of
existing law upon the actual lives of women, which leads to another:
are men and women different, and if so, in what ways? Surely legal
doctrine must take account of such issues. The second question asks
us to consider in what ways, if any, the modernist conception of law is
itself gendered. Can—should—the lines between self and Other, reason
and emotion, justice and mercy be blurred? Can—should—there be

50 | VCU Menorah Review
a new paradigm to our binary way of thinking? Last Stone points out
that while feminism has influenced general legal theory, its impact
upon Jewish law has been far less. In the same way Christian feminists have often blamed Judaism and the Hebrew Bible for patriarchy
in general (and in Christianity in particular) feminist legal scholars
sometimes view the monotheism of Judaism as the foundation of
authoritarian, patriarchal traditions in Western culture a perspective I
heard espoused numerous times at meetings of the American Academy
of Religion/Society of Biblical Literature. Monotheism is seen as cold,
rigid, abstract, and hierarchical, while pluralism is viewed as open and
more accepting of emotions and differences. This narrow construing
of the rich traditions of Judaism arises primarily because familiarity
with Judaism is usually based solely on knowledge of the biblical texts.
Judaism—even in the twentieth–first century—is identified with the
Hebrew Scriptures as mediated by centuries of Christian interpretation,
and usually not at all with the corpus of rabbinic traditions. Understanding mercy and justice in Judaism requires sidestepping the Western Christian influence on the legal system and looking at the rabbinic
system as an alternate paradigm, one able to critique the dominant
conceptual perspective. Some claim that Jewish law has feminist aspects, despite its male focus. It emphasizes community, relatedness,
and specific responsibilities and is framed by an ethic of care. Rabbinic
law and feminist jurisprudence, according to Last Stone, illuminate and
enrich each other.
Last Stone begins this exchange by exploring the rabbinic concept of
justice. As multiple biblical sources indicate, God in the Hebrew Bible
is a nuanced figure, having a variety of appellations, each indicating a
different attribute. God manifests both strict justice and mercy. These
polarities indicate the complexity of the Godhead and God’s relation
to humanity and are found in numerous interpretations of the text.
Justice and mercy are intertwined and interdependent, especially in
the multilayered midrashic literature. The text upon which Last Stone
grounds her analysis is the well–known midrash from Lamentations
Rabbah based on Jeremiah 31:14–17. Why is it that God responds to
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the pleading of Rachel and not to the beseeching of the patriarchs and
even of Moses? Last Stone’s elucidation of the imagery in Jeremiah,
including Jeremiah 11:19 and 31:28–29 is rich with insight, demonstrating how the etiology of the midrash comes to be that god “learns”
mercy from the figure of Rachel. And what is mercy? According to Last
Stone, it entails the ability to curb jealousy when overpowered by love,
as exemplified in the midrash of Rachel sharing her secrets with Leah
prior to Leah’s marriage to Jacob. Mercy is an act of love, outside the
context of justice.
In Lamentations Rabbah, the male figures—the patriarchs and Moses—question the justness of God’s decree through logical argument,
while Rachel’s response embodies the emotional aspects. But does the
choice of Rachel as this embodiment reflect assumptions about the
nature of “the feminine” in rabbinic thinking? The interpretations are
varied. Some see Rachel as a generic representation of human mercy,
while others note that national suffering in the Book of Lamentations
is personified as a woman in distress. Thus it makes sense that the
source of solace in the midrash is a feminine voice. Last Stone also
discusses the image of God as parent and the people Israel as children, an image made explicit in the pleadings of the patriarchs, Moses,
and Rachel. Does Rachel’s voice succeed in arousing God’s compassion
because it is maternal? It seems that only occasionally is God’s attribute of mercy specifically associated with the feminine, despite the
etymological connection between the Hebrew word for “compassion”
and the noun meaning “womb.” The image of God as a loving parent
equates maternal and paternal love, demonstrating fluidity in the rabbinic use of gender imagery. But an assymetry exists in that while men
are often characterized as having feminine qualities, such as mercy,
other attributes, such as legal reasoning, are seen as exclusively male.
Is this assymetry due to an essentialist understanding in rabbinic culture regarding male and female nature or is it motivated by molding
societal behavior so as to build a particular vision of community? As
Last Stone notes, this question divides the modern Jewish community
and she does not argue for either side. She states, however, that the
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gender imbalance “seems to be less a function of assymetrical valuing
of the genders themselves than that...men will elevate the importance
of the role they believe they are obligated to perform”(Last Stone
283), a valuable insight.
Feminist jurisprudence seeks to reveal the gender and theological
assumptions undergirding modern law in order to consider possible
new configurations and concepts. It has uprooted itself from ancient
roots which are modeled on impersonal rules and divine (male) justice
and logic. Rabbinic ruminations on justice and mercy contribute to this
rethinking by offering an alternate model of Divine justice, one which
includes compassion and connectedness, jealousy and love, as integral
to the notion of how God acts in the world. As Last–Stone indicates,
how feminist discourse and rabbinic law will influence and enhance
each other is a project just begun. This thought–provoking essay is an
excellent contribution to the conversation.
In “Reconstructing Divine Power: Post–Holocaust Jewish Theology,
Feminism, and Process Philosophy,” Sandra B. Lubarsky brings the perspectives of feminism and process philosophy to bear upon the thorny
problem of theodicy as considered in post–Holocaust theology.
Her thesis is that post–Holocaust Jewish theologians, for the most
part, have continued to view Divine power in traditional terms (i.e.
God’s omnipotence as coercive power), which Lubarsky finds problematic. She begins by exploring the thinking of Eliezer Berkowitz and
Irving Greenberg, both of whom write of God’s self–limitation of power
as the sine qua non for human freedom, thus explaining God’s lack of
intervention in the face of suffering due to moral evil. Lubarsky then
critiques the notion of Divine hiddenness using a feminist lens and
finally analyzes power based on the principles of process philosophy.
The philosophical transformation of power based on a “relational metaphysics” has a significant impact, she claims, upon post–Holocaust
theology and theodicy.
Lubarsky characterizes Martin Buber, Eliezer Berkovits, and Irving
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Greenberg as “absence theologians, “releasing God from the culpability
of inaction. God’s refraining from intervention, God’s seeming indifference to suffering reflects, in their understanding, God’s hiddenness,
which is then, indeed, also God’s presence. Put another way, “...divine
absence is a structural requirement that protects human existence in
relation to divine omnipotence” (295). But there are certain problems
in Lubarsky’s formulation. The complexity of theodicy requires meticulous attention to the minutiae of philosophical analysis. Even as she
sets up the argument, she notes that for “absence theologians,” the
power which God curtails is coercive power. Yet there is a distinction
between brute force—as in the power of Niagara Falls—and coercive
power, which requires intent and control. There is also relational
power. I would say that omnipotence does not always—or necessarily—
connote physical power. That omnipotence is traditionally construed
only as coercive power is not the full picture. One might also question
the notion of God’s restraint/indifference in order to allow for free will.
It could be argued that God would permit no more evil than absolutely
necessary for free will to exist. Yet the Holocaust surely goes beyond
this In Berkovits’s theodicy, God abandons the world out of respect
for human freedom, no matter how abused. But God’s indifference is
predicated, it seems, on an understanding of God’s power as physical
and coercive. Thus God is essentially omnipotent, yet “impotent in
history” (296).
To me, this seems a misreading of Berkovits, who attempts, perhaps
desperately, to maintain the paradox of a powerful God who cares
about the covenant with the God who remained hidden during the
Shoah. Lubarsky reads Berkovits as removing God entirely from the
historical arena. I would say that Berkovits affirms two contradictory
ideas. To construe this as a removal from history and the covenantal
arena is to affirm a kind of deism and to carry the idea to a conclusion
Berkovits would have rejected.
Greenberg’s view of God as self–limiting is similar to that of Berkovits,
but moves in a different direction. Greenberg argues that God is present in history, but not as an all–powerful, supernatural being. Rather,
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God remains hidden in order for human beings to become more and
more responsible. As covenantal partners in perfecting the world, each
person has the task of increasing the way s/he reflects God’s image by
augmenting responsibility for the events of history. God’s overwhelming supernatural powers were manifest in the infancy of history. Now,
however, we are ever more accountable for our world, which increases
human dignity. Similarly to Berkovits, Greenberg writes: “The deepest
paradox of the Rabbis’ teaching was that the more God is hidden, the
more God is present” (297). For Greenberg, the establishment of the
state of Israel (for Jews) is the strongest validation of God’s hiddenness through human effort. Greenberg confronts the despair over the
Holocaust, yet affirms covenantal renewal “in the living presence of a
redemptive God” (294).
Two interesting points arise in Lubarsky’s critique of Greenberg. First,
she insists that Greenberg construes God’s power solely as physical
force. And secondly, she maintains that since God’s activity is expressed through human agency, the covenant is undermined. Both of
these claims require further analysis and support; I am not sure they
will stand up to scrutiny.
Based on the earlier claim that in post–Holocaust Jewish theology
divine omnipotence always connotes physical power, Lubarsky identifies omnipotence with the patriarchal, dominating power rightly
criticized by feminism. “For it is patriarchal power,” she writes, “that
continues...to inform the thought of most post–Holocaust theologians”
(301) She then identifies the hiddenness, or invisibility, of women with
the hiddenness of God, arguing that feminist emphasis on relational
power offers a corrective to the faulty theological strategy of divine
hiddenness.
While astute in some ways, this argument is flawed, for the hiddenness of women means culture and society conspire to make women
invisible. This is much different from the conscious withdrawal or abandonment ascribed to God by Berkovits and Greenberg.
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The concluding section of this essay is a fascinating application of process theology to the concept of divine power and is based on the writings of Alfred N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. The two sources
of power in process theology are self–determination and efficient
causation, which alter the traditional understanding of omnipotence to
mean Divine power existing in relation to human power. That is, divine
power need not be curtailed to allow for human freedom. Evil exists
not because God “allows” it, but because free human beings choose to
ignore or contravene God’s will. According to Lubarsky, feminist and
process thinkers affirm that true empowerment derives from “persuasive agency,” the strongest aspect of which is love. Thus God can be
powerful without being coercive and without affecting human freedom.
Applying process theology to the conundrum of theodicy is creative,
although feminist theory doesn’t fit quite as snugly. Both, however,
are assumed to circumvent the problem of Divine power as formulated
earlier in the essay. Despite its interesting parallels and insights, the
thorns still prick on the issue of theodicy.
Finally, two small things: notes 28 and 32 should cite the primary
sources, and I would have wished for at least a brief reference to
Zachary Braiterman’s book, (God) After Auschwitz: Tradition and
Change in Post–Holocaust Jewish Thought (Princeton University Press:
1998), probably the best modern treatment of theodicy.
The other essays in the volume are as intriguing as these. Their
themes range from feminism and Marxism, to epistemology, rabbinic
exegesis, political philosophy, and even more about Emanuel Levinas.
Rich and variegated, this collection illuminates the intersecting of
gender and Jewish philosophy, constructing a foundation for further
analysis.
Rochelle L. Millen is a professor of religion at Wittenberg University
and a contributing editor.
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Reckoning with Rival Religions
A review essay by Esther R. Nelson
God Is Not One: The Eight Rival Religions that Run the World—
and Why Their Differences Matter by Stephen Prothero. New
York: HarperCollins Publisher.
Prothero, in this excellent volume, claims to give us “new ways to
enter into the ten thousand gates of human religiosity” (p. 338). He
describes with some detail the diversity of eight world religions—Islam,
Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Yoruba Religion,
Judaism, and Daoism. He adds a chapter titled, “A Brief Coda on Atheism,” although states at the outset of that chapter, “Atheism is not a
great religion [n]onetheless, atheism stands in a venerable tradition…”
(p. 317).
“Religion is now widely defined, by scholars and judges alike, in functional rather than substantive terms. Instead of focusing on some
creedal criterion such as belief in God, we look for family resemblances” (p. 324). Members of the family of religions typically exhibit Four
Cs: creed (statements of beliefs and values), cultus (ritual activities),
code (standards for ethical conduct), and community (institutions).
Prothero thinks it is imperative that we understand how various
religions apply these “Four Cs,” not just so we can be religiously literate—something Prothero argues for in his book, Religious Literacy
What Every American Needs to Know—and Doesn’t (HarperCollins
Publishers, 2007)—but so we can see how religious beliefs orchestrate
world events. “Religion was behind both the creation of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan in 1947 and the founding of the state of Israel in
1948, both the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Reagan Revolution
of the 1980s” (p. 10).
“Religious folk worldwide agree that something has gone awry. They
part company, however, when it comes to stating just what has gone
wrong, and they diverge sharply when they move from diagnosing
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the human problem to prescribing how to solve it” (p. 11). Prothero
uses a four-part approach to his description and explanation of religions: a problem, a solution, which also serves as the religious goal,
a technique(s) for moving from this problem to this solution, and an
exemplar(s) who charts this path from problem to solution. In Judaism, for example, “this problem is exile—distance from God and from
where we ought to be. The solution is return—to go back to God and to
our true home. The techniques for making this journey are two: to tell
the story and follow the law—to remember and to obey” (p. 253). The
exemplars who chart this path are the Jewish people themselves who
remember and obey while “wrestling with God.”
Prothero’s emphasis throughout this volume focuses on the differences
among religious traditions. He is critical of Huston Smith (philosopher
of religion, b. 1919) who writes, “At base, in the foothills of theology,
ritual, and organizational structure, the religions are distinct But beyond these differences, the same goal beckons” (p. 1). Not so, says
Prothero. “One of the most common misconceptions about the world’s
religions is that they plumb the same depths, ask the same questions.
They do not. Only religions that see God as all good ask how a good
God can allow millions to die in tsunamis. Only religions that believe in
souls ask whether your soul exists before you are born and what happens to it after you die” (p. 24).
“One purpose of the ‘all religions are one’ mantra is to stop this fighting and killing” (p. 3). “I too hope for a world in which human beings
can get along with their religious rivals. I am convinced, however,
that we need to pursue this goal through new means. Rather than
beginning with the sort of Godthink that lumps all religions together in
one trash can or treasure chest, we must start with a clear–eyed understanding of the fundamental differences in both belief and practice
between Islam and Christianity, Confucianism and Hinduism” (p. 335).
“In our bones” we know there are significant differences. We don’t
speak about having to “tolerate” a religion that is in agreement with
our own.
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Prothero adds, “The world’s religious rivals do converge when it comes
to ethics, but they diverge sharply on doctrine, ritual, mythology, experience, and law” (p. 3). “No religion sees ethics alone as its reason
for being” (p. 2). Prothero notes the work of Eboo Patel, a Muslim who
runs Chicago-based Interfaith Youth Core, as a positive force as he
(Patel) puts participants of different faiths “to work on community–
based projects, encouraging them to discuss how their very different
traditions impel them toward a shared commitment to service” (p.
336). This is a good example of how religious rivals converge on ethics. It’s the only “convergence” Prothero mentions.
I don’t see why the rituals, mythologies, and experiences of “religious
rivals” could not converge as well, forming a rich, diverse tapestry of
the various ways people have imaginatively approached and “entered
into” both sacred and profane space—impelling us forward to celebrate
and honor our shared humanity.
Esther R. Nelson is adjunct professor of religious studies at Virginia
Commonwealth University.
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Two Poems
By Richard Sherwin
All night the outside
rain the roof tiles echoing
my hollow brainfall
youre home youre safe this moment
transient and glittering

singing above deaths
burden melodies whos such
to call designed or
unintelligent or nought
but sparks of darkness rubbing

words into meaning
less and more than lies the law
our blessing curse and
evaporated poem
our flood a stain of dried sweat

******************

mad cows chomping my
synapses cud and asian
birds pecking my lungs
and scientists spraying my
guts with ddtd greens and
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garbage polluting
the wells and now these wouldbe
imperialists
irradiating what alls
left us who needs death to die

Im joining rainbow
peace movements everywhere so
fast I’ll be dodging
everything this lethal world
throws at my dekoshered ghost

worlds ends come and gone
and judgment in and we’re out
and I refuse to
compete with cockroaches and
rats for whats left of this rock
Richard Sherwin is associate professor of English (ret.) at Bar Ilan
University, Israel, and poetry editor of Menorah Review.
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Zachor: An Appeal for the Ransom of Captives
According to Jewish law, Jews are obliged to ransom their coreligionists
from captivity. In the 11th century those of Fostat (ancient Cairo) and
Alexandria, were frequently called upon to fulfill this obligation. Jews
were great seafarers, and the Mediterranean was infected with pirates
in those days. The capture of Jews was, therefore, a daily occurrence.
They were largely taken prisoners for the express purpose of blackmailing Jewish communities. Great sacrifices were made in order to
provide the sums demanded by the brigands, but in many cases single
communities were unable to cover the expenses from their own resources, and thus appealed to communities abroad. The letters written
for this purpose are testimonies to the solidarity of the Jewish people
and their pious obedience to the Law. They are also the first documentary traces of that organized relief and rescue work.
The Cairo Genizah contained many such letters, of which the following
is a good example, though it is somewhat incomplete.
The Jews of Alexandria to Ephraim ben Shemarya and the Elders of
the Palestinian Community of Fostat. [Alexandria, first half of the 11th
century]
To the highly respected Rabbi Ephraim, member of the great assembly,
son of the Rabbi Shemarya, of blessed memory, and the Elders, the
noble and highly honored men, may the Lord protect them, from your
friends, the community of Alexandria, best greetings! You are the
supporters of the poor and the aid of the men in need, you study diligently, you rouse the good against the evil inclination. You walk in the
right way and practice justice. We let you know that we always pray
for you. May God grant you peace and security!
We turn to you today on behalf of a captive woman who has been
brought from Byzantium. We ransomed her for 24 denares besides the
governmental tax. You sent us 12 denares; we have paid the remainder and the tax. Soon afterwards, sailors brought two other prisoners,
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one of them a fine young man possessing knowledge of the Torah,
the other a boy of about ten. When we saw them in the hands of the
pirates, and how they beat and frightened them before our own eyes,
we had pity on them and guaranteed their ransom. We had hardly
settled this, when another ship arrived carrying many prisoners...

